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Law Review (Economics): Choi, James J. and Huang, Dong and Yang, Zhishu and Zhang, Qi, How Good is Ai at Twisting Arms? Experiments in Debt Collection (April 2025). NBER Working Paper No. w33669

Law Review (Economics): Choi, James J. and Huang, Dong and Yang, Zhishu and Zhang, Qi, How Good is Ai at Twisting Arms? Experiments in Debt Collection (April 2025). NBER Working Paper No. w33669 Ed Boltz Tue, 10/14/2025 - 17:41 Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5215980 Abstract: How good is AI at persuading humans to perform costly actions? We study calls made to get delinquent consumer borrowers to repay. Regression discontinuity and a randomized experiment reveal that AI is substantially less effective than human callers. Replacing AI with humans six days into delinquency closes much of the gap. But borrowers initially contacted by AI have repaid 1% less of the initial late payment one year later and are more likely to miss subsequent payments than borrowers who were always called by humans. AI’s lesser ability to extract promises that feel binding may contribute to the performance gap. Commentary: A recent study published by the National Bureau of Economic Research examining Chinese consumers’ reactions to debt collection, including the use of AI-driven “collectors,” offers interesting insights—but while its conclusions rest heavily on psychological and behavioral research conducted by U.S. scholars on fairness, compliance, and emotional response in debt collection and originated in the American context leaves substantial questions about how transitive those findings really are between the sharply different regulatory and social environment in China and the United States (let alone elsewhere.) In China (with a full admission that I'm only a North Carolina Bankruptcy Expert!), consumer bankruptcy remains rare, with only limited pilot programs in a handful of provinces and far fewer formal protections for over-indebted individuals. Without leaning too hard on cultural generalizations, collection practices therefore tend to rely on social pressure and moral appeals, often leveraging family networks and reputational risk, rather than the structured statutory regimes familiar to U.S. practitioners. Against this backdrop, the finding that Chinese consumers respond more favorably to “empathetic” or “respectful” AI collectors may reflect local cultural expectations about deference and face-saving, rather than a universal truth about human-machine interaction. By contrast, in the United States, debt collection operates within a robust legal framework of consumer protection—anchored by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and state Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Acts (UDTPA) such as North Carolina’s § 75-1.1. While social stigma and moral hazard still play a substantial role, these laws don’t merely regulate behavior; they define the very boundaries of communication. A U.S. consumer must be told who is collecting the debt, how much is owed, and how to dispute it—and harassment or misrepresentation is strictly prohibited. Moreover, Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy provide predictable, court-supervised debt-relief channels unavailable to most Chinese consumers, fundamentally altering both the power dynamics and the perceived legitimacy of collection efforts. Given that backdrop, an AI debt collector operating in the United States would almost certainly be required not only to disclose that it is a debt collector, but also that it is an artificial intelligence system. Failure to do so could violate the FDCPA’s prohibitions on “false, deceptive, or misleading representations,” particularly if the AI’s design made a consumer believe they were conversing with a human being. The CFPB’s 2024 digital-communication guidance and the FTC’s emerging policies on AI transparency both suggest that accuracy of identity and medium are integral to consumer protection. (The viability of these policies, however, may be in doubt under the current U.S. administration.) The deeper lesson, then, is that technology doesn’t operate in a vacuum. It reflects the social and legal system that deploys it. Where Chinese law emphasizes harmony and moral rehabilitation over statutory procedure, AI may simply mechanize social pressure. In the United States, by contrast, our debt-collection system—grounded in disclosure, due process, and the constitutional promise of a “fresh start” through bankruptcy—would demand that even machines play by the same rules of fairness and honesty that govern human collectors. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document ai-debt-collection-20250331.pdf (3.47 MB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

N.C. Ct. of Appeals: Irish Creek HOA v. Rogers - Foreclosure Set Aside as Covid-Era Service was Insufficient

N.C. Ct. of Appeals: Irish Creek HOA v. Rogers - Foreclosure Set Aside as Covid-Era Service was Insufficient Ed Boltz Wed, 10/01/2025 - 18:05 Summary : Trenita Rogers bought her Winterville home in 2010, subject to the Irish Creek HOA. In 2021, after allegedly failing to pay $1,391.23 in assessments, the HOA filed liens and moved forward with foreclosure. Notice was attempted by certified mail during the USPS’s Covid-19 “contactless” protocol—where carriers often signed “C19” themselves instead of obtaining the addressee’s signature—and by sheriff posting without a proper court order. Rogers never appeared at the foreclosure hearing, and the property was sold at auction in 2022 after a lengthy upset bid process, ultimately bringing over $221,000. Rogers claimed she had never actually been served, that she did not recall receiving HOA bills, and that she would have cured the arrears had she known of the hearing. She moved to set aside the foreclosure under Rule 60, but both the Clerk and Superior Court rejected her arguments, finding service sufficient and her neglect “inexcusable.” The trial court even ordered her to pay over $26,000 in attorney’s fees to the HOA, the trustee, and the purchaser for bringing a “meritless” motion. When Rogers attempted appeal, the Superior Court dismissed it for failure to timely serve the proposed record on appeal under Rule 11(b), citing her supposed lack of diligence and candor. Holding: The Court of Appeals reversed. First, it found the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the appeal without applying the Dogwood framework for whether a procedural violation was a “substantial failure” or “gross violation.” More importantly, it held that USPS Covid-19 contactless protocols did not satisfy the strict requirements of Rule 4 service by certified mail. With no signature of Rogers or even her initials, there was no valid service, and thus no jurisdiction for the foreclosure order. The Court reversed the denial of Rogers’ Rule 60 motion, vacated the attorney fee awards, and remanded for consideration of remedies, including whether the purchaser was a good-faith buyer and whether the foreclosure price was adequate. Commentary: This case illustrates how procedural shortcuts in service can unravel an entire foreclosure years later, especially when courts and trustees relied on the USPS’s makeshift Covid protocols. The appellate court rightly emphasized that the purpose of certified mail service is to prove actual notice, and “Covid-19” scrawled by a mail carrier does not create jurisdiction. It is also a cautionary tale about the tendency of trial courts to punish homeowners with crushing attorney fee awards when they contest foreclosures. Rogers was saddled with nearly $30,000 in fees for daring to argue she had not been served—a position ultimately vindicated by the Court of Appeals. The panel’s decision to vacate those awards restores some balance. Finally, the case tees up important questions on remand: what happens to the purchaser, who paid over $220,000 in upset bids, and whether the sale price was “grossly inadequate” under North Carolina law. This tension between protecting homeowners from defective process and protecting finality for bidders will continue to play out. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document irish_creek_hoa_v._rogers.pdf (213.29 KB) Category NC Court of Appeals

Bankr. M.D.N.C: In re Rogers- Postpetition Fees, Rule 3002.1, and N.C.G.S. § 45-91

Bankr. M.D.N.C: In re Rogers- Postpetition Fees, Rule 3002.1, and N.C.G.S. § 45-91 Ed Boltz Mon, 09/29/2025 - 17:40 Summary: Following In re Owens and In re Peach from the W.D.N.C., Judge Kahn weighed in on the increasingly thorny interplay between Rule 3002.1 notices of postpetition fees and North Carolina’s Mortgage Debt Collection and Servicing Act (§ 45-91). Here, the debtor, Christopher Rogers, was not personally liable on the mortgage note—his non-filing spouse was—but the couple’s residence was encumbered by a deed of trust in favor of SIRVA Mortgage. The loan was contractually current at filing, yet SIRVA filed a proof of claim asserting a projected escrow shortage and, later, a Rule 3002.1(c) notice claiming a $400 “proof of claim fee.” At the same time, SIRVA sent the debtor’s spouse separate state-law notices under § 45-91 listing over $950 in “BNK ATTY FEES & COSTS.” The debtor, relying on In re Owens (Whitley, J.) and the recent In re Peach (Beyer, J.), objected, arguing that this “dual booking” practice violated Rule 3002.1’s disclosure mandate. Court’s Ruling Violation of Rule 3002.1(c): Judge Kahn held that SIRVA’s conflicting notices ran afoul of Rule 3002.1, which was designed to prevent hidden or undisclosed fees from ambushing Chapter 13 debtors after plan completion. Interpretation of § 45-91: The court rejected SIRVA’s strained reading that the statute requires servicers to “assess” every conceivable fee, even those never intended to be collected. Instead, “assess” means impose—not merely “note” or “disclose.” Thus, notices of waived or phantom fees were not required. No Safe Harbor in Federal/State Regulations: Other federal mortgage servicing regulations (e.g., RESPA’s Reg. X, TILA’s Reg. Z) only require reporting of transactions that actually credit or debit the account, not ghost fees. Adoption of Owens and Peach: Like Judges Whitley and Beyer, Judge Kahn ruled that subjective creditor intent is irrelevant; if fees are assessed to the account, they must be noticed under Rule 3002.1. Remedy: The court disallowed both the $400 proof of claim fee and the undisclosed $551.69 of additional charges, and prohibited SIRVA from ever seeking to recover them against the debtor or the property. Commentary: This decision reinforces a bright-line “use it or lose it” approach to Rule 3002.1. Servicers cannot play a double game—filing sanitized notices in bankruptcy court while simultaneously sending borrowers conflicting state-law statements padded with attorney’s fees. The ruling also provides much-needed clarity on § 45-91, reading it in its plain sense as a consumer protection measure designed to limit fees, not generate paperwork for phantom charges. This aligns with legislative intent to protect homeowners from abusive servicing practices and avoids the absurdity of requiring disclosure of fees the creditor admits it cannot collect. Practically, this case is a reminder that debtor’s counsel must stay vigilant. Here, counsel Koury Hicks deserves praise for spotting the discrepancy and forcing judicial review. Without objection, those $951 in “assessed” fees might have lurked as a future foreclosure trap, exactly the problem Rule 3002.1 was enacted to prevent. The opinion joins Owens and Peach in building a solid body of North Carolina precedent insisting on full transparency and accountability from mortgage servicers. One suspects that repeated violations may soon warrant harsher sanctions under Rule 3002.1(i) and § 45-91, especially if servicers continue to shrug off the rule as mere paperwork. Whether those arise in bankruptcy courts or through class action lawsuits elsewhere remains to be seen. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document in_re_christopher_rogers.pdf (714.61 KB) Category Middle District

M.D.N.C.: Danny K. v. Experian- FCRA Claim Forced into Arbitration by Credit Monitoring Click-Through

M.D.N.C.: Danny K. v. Experian- FCRA Claim Forced into Arbitration by Credit Monitoring Click-Through Ed Boltz Fri, 09/26/2025 - 15:17 Summary: In this case, a veteran found his home purchase delayed because Experian could not generate his credit report—an error caused by Experian’s system refusing to recognize his legal last name, “K.” As a result, he was forced into a higher-rate variable mortgage and an extra month of rent. He sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Experian’s defense, however, was not to correct the obvious error but to argue that the case should never see the inside of a courtroom. Relying on its “CreditWorks” monitoring product, Experian claimed the plaintiff had agreed to binding arbitration when he clicked through an online enrollment form. That arbitration clause was drafted with sweeping reach, explicitly covering FCRA claims, and even included a delegation clause that gave the arbitrator—rather than the court—the power to decide whether Experian had waived arbitration by waiting nearly a year to raise it. Judge Schroeder, following Fourth Circuit precedent in Austin v. Experian and similar cases, agreed with Experian, compelled arbitration, and stayed the case. Commentary: This decision highlights the collision between consumer rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the near-ubiquitous arbitration clauses buried in credit monitoring services. What begins as a straightforward FCRA violation—wrongly reporting a consumer’s name and costing him thousands of dollars—ends not in open court but in private arbitration. For consumer bankruptcy attorneys, the lesson is clear: our clients often unwittingly give up their right to sue when they sign up for “free credit monitoring” or identity theft protection products, sometimes encouraged by creditors themselves after a data breach. The arbitration clauses in these agreements are drafted to funnel virtually every dispute, including FCRA and FDCPA claims, out of the courts. And once in arbitration, damages are often narrower, discovery more limited, and precedent nonexistent. Is arbitration so bad? Consumers and their advocates almost uniformly resist arbitration clauses, seeing them as creditor-friendly traps. The perception is that arbitration denies transparency, limits discovery, and stifles precedent, all to the detriment of consumers. But this perhaps reflexive aversion deserves closer thought. If arbitrators are truly neutral and professional, consumers might actually welcome arbitration. Speedier and lower-cost adjudications would benefit debtors much more than protracted litigation. If, on the other hand, arbitrators are venal and corrupt—as many suspect—then consumers might still find a silver lining or two . Self-interested arbitrators, seeing a gravy train of consumer rights claims, might decide that favoring those consumers is likely to keep more cases coming. Additionally, because the creditor pays the filing and administrative fees, flooding arbitration providers with FCRA, FDCPA, and consumer finance claims could impose massive costs on repeat players like Experian, forcing either quicker settlements or systemic change. This paradox underscores that arbitration need not be the end of consumer remedies—it might, if strategically embraced, become a tool for pressure. Still, the loss of public precedent is profound, especially in areas like credit reporting and debt collection where systemic patterns matter. For now, district courts remain the only reliable venue for shaping consumer protection law—but only if consumers can avoid clicking “I Agree.” For instructions on how to get a credit report but avoid "click-through", see my previous post regarding Austin v. Experian. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document danny_k_v._experian.pdf (220.28 KB) Category Middle District

M.D.N.C.: Joyner-Perry v. Selene- FDCPA & NC Debt Collection Claims Survive Motion to Dismiss by Mortgage Servicer

M.D.N.C.: Joyner-Perry v. Selene- FDCPA & NC Debt Collection Claims Survive Motion to Dismiss by Mortgage Servicer Ed Boltz Thu, 09/25/2025 - 17:12 Summary: Three North Carolina homeowners brought a putative class action against Selene Finance, alleging that Selene’s standardized “default and intent to accelerate” letters violated the FDCPA, the North Carolina Debt Collection Act, and the North Carolina Collection Agencies Act. They also asserted negligent misrepresentation under state law. Selene moved to dismiss. Judge Schroeder denied most of Selene’s motion, allowing the FDCPA and state debt collection claims to proceed. He held that even though Selene used the conditional word “may,” its threats of acceleration and foreclosure could still mislead the least sophisticated consumer if Selene did not, in fact, intend to follow through on such threats. As the court explained, “conditional language does not insulate a debt collector from liability” when the practice is to never actually accelerate or foreclose under the terms described. The court likewise sustained claims under the NCDCA and NCCAA, noting that “informational injury” suffices to show harm. Only negligent misrepresentation was dismissed for lack of allegations of pecuniary loss. One plaintiff, Joyner-Perry, was dismissed from the FDCPA subclass because her loan was not in default when Selene acquired it. Commentary: While this case is framed as a consumer protection class action under the FDCPA and North Carolina debt collection statutes, it should not be overlooked that many of the putative class members almost certainly also passed through the bankruptcy courts—most often Chapter 13—during their struggles with Selene. Selene is a frequent filer of proofs of claim in Chapter 13 cases in North Carolina, and the standardized letters at issue here would have overlapped with bankruptcy filings. That raises two important concerns. First, damages from these improper collection communications should include not just emotional distress and informational injury, but also the very real costs imposed when any of these borrowers resorted to bankruptcy protection: attorneys’ fees, Chapter 13 trustee commissions, court filing fees, and the years-long burden of repayment plans. Any settlement or award must account for those harms, which flow directly from Selene’s practices. Second, if there is a class wide recovery, its distribution should reflect the difficulty of getting relief in bankruptcy court itself. As practitioners know, consumer rights claims—particularly FDCPA and state law claims—tend to see stronger outcomes in federal district court than when brought in bankruptcy courts, where they are too often minimized as tangential to case administration. Given these realities, coordination between any recovery in this case and parallel or past bankruptcy proceedings is critical. NACBA (the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys) is well-positioned to assist in such coordination, ensuring that debtors who filed Chapter 13 are not overlooked, and would be an appropriate recipient for any cy pres award if direct distribution proves impractical. This case underscores the importance of federal district courts in vindicating consumer rights against mortgage servicers, and it highlights the need for thoughtful resolution that takes into account the full spectrum of damages suffered by homeowners—including the costs of bankruptcy itself. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document joyner-perry_v._selene.pdf (165.75 KB) Category Middle District

Bankr. W.D.N.C.- In re Gilbert- Sua Sponte Dismissal Hearing for Third Filing, Despite no Automatic Stay

Bankr. W.D.N.C.- In re Gilbert- Sua Sponte Dismissal Hearing for Third Filing, Despite no Automatic Stay Ed Boltz Wed, 09/24/2025 - 16:32 Summary and Commentary (In re Gilbert, W.D.N.C. 2025) Russell Wade Gilbert filed his third Chapter 13 case in just over fourteen months, all pro se and without an attorney. His first case (June 2024) was dismissed for failure to propose a feasible plan, make initial payments, and file required tax returns. His second case (November 2024) was dismissed in July 2025 for defaulting on plan payments. Just six weeks later, he filed the present case in August 2025. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4), when a debtor has had two or more bankruptcy cases dismissed within the preceding year, no automatic stay goes into effect in the new filing. Instead, the debtor must request that the court impose a stay, and only after notice and hearing can the court do so if the debtor shows the case was filed in good faith. Judge Ashley Austin Edwards’ show cause order specifically noted that, because Gilbert had two prior dismissals in the past year, “the automatic stay is not in effect in this case”. The claims filed in his prior case were modest. The IRS and N.C. Department of Revenue were owed less than $1,000 in total. The only significant creditor was the Kania Law Firm, holding a $9,776.83 secured claim for attorney’s fees and costs from a tax foreclosure proceeding. That raises the practical question: is a hearing even necessary here? Since no stay exists, both Kania (as foreclosure counsel), the IRS, and NCDOR are free to pursue collection and enforcement remedies immediately, without needing relief from stay. Unless Gilbert requests and persuades the Court to impose a stay under § 362(c)(4)(B), the creditors are not restricted. Commentary: This case highlights how serial pro se filings often operate less as genuine efforts to reorganize than as attempts to forestall inevitable foreclosure or collection. The Bankruptcy Code already provides a built-in safeguard against abuse—§ 362(c)(4) strips repeat filers of the automatic stay. Here, where the debtor owes only small amounts to taxing authorities and the bulk of the claim lies with foreclosure counsel, the practical effect of the third filing is minimal. Creditors can simply proceed as if no bankruptcy had been filed at all. The Court has nonetheless scheduled what appears to be an unnecessary show cause hearing, since absent a motion for stay protection by the debtor, the outcome seems foreordained: dismissal or at best, a stern warning that without good faith (and without counsel), Chapter 13 offers no refuge. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document in_re_gilbert.pdf (219.11 KB) Category Western District

Bankr. E.D.N.C.: Sanderson v. Gross Family Trust- Avoidance of "Estate Planning" Transfer

Bankr. E.D.N.C.: Sanderson v. Gross Family Trust- Avoidance of "Estate Planning" Transfer Ed Boltz Tue, 09/23/2025 - 17:50 Summary: This adversary proceeding arose out of the collapse of Wireless Systems Solutions, LLC, a company almost entirely owned and controlled by Susan and Laslo Gross. In 2019, Wireless entered into a Teaming Agreement with SmartSky Networks, which carried potential damages of up to $10 million for breach. By early 2020, the relationship with SmartSky was unraveling, and Wireless faced mounting liabilities. At the same time, Mrs. Gross created the Susan L. Gross Family Trust, naming her husband as trustee and their children as beneficiaries. On March 6, 2020, Wireless transferred $1 million into that Trust. Within weeks, the Trust used much of those funds to buy real estate in Watauga County, while Wireless’s finances spiraled further downward. The Chapter 7 Trustee sought to claw back the transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) and North Carolina’s Uniform Voidable Transactions Act. The court found that the transfer bore numerous badges of fraud: it was made to an insider, for no consideration, while Wireless faced mounting debts and litigation with SmartSky, and under the complete control of the same insiders who ran the company. The supposed justification—“estate planning”—was dismissed as a post hoc gloss on what was in reality an asset-protection scheme. The court concluded that the transfer was both an actual fraudulent transfer (§ 39-23.4(a)(1)) and a constructively fraudulent transfer (§ 39-23.4(a)(2)) and entered judgment for the Trustee, avoiding the transfer. Commentary: This case is a reminder that calling something “estate planning” does not immunize insider transfers when creditors are already circling. The Grosses’ attempt to move $1 million out of their closely held company into a family trust—right as litigation with their only major customer loomed—was almost a textbook case of fraudulent transfer. Judge Callaway was especially critical of Mrs. Gross’s shifting testimony, noting her “selective memory issues” and tendency to shape her story to the moment. The defendants implicitly invoked the idea that they were acting on professional advice when setting up the trust. Here, the “advice of counsel” defense, as discussed by the Fourth Circuit in Sugar v. Burnett (2024), is instructive. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that reliance on counsel can negate fraudulent intent only where the debtor (1) fully discloses material facts, (2) seeks advice in good faith, and (3) reasonably relies on that advice. In the Grosses’ case, those elements were lacking: Mrs. Gross downplayed or denied critical facts about Wireless’s deteriorating relationship with SmartSky, their timing showed asset-protection motives rather than good-faith estate planning, and no reasonable person could believe that siphoning $1 million from an operating business on the brink of litigation would be immune from avoidance simply because it passed through a lawyer’s hands. The lesson for debtors and their counsel is clear: a debtor cannot launder fraudulent intent through an estate planning lawyer. Estate planning advice may provide a veneer of legitimacy, but without candor, good faith, and reasonableness, it will not withstand scrutiny. For practitioners, two points stand out: Badges of fraud add up. Insider transfers, lack of consideration, and impending liabilities will overwhelm “estate planning” rationales. Advice of counsel is not a shield without transparency. Following Sugar v. Burnett, courts in the Fourth Circuit will demand evidence that the debtor disclosed the whole picture to their attorneys, both in bankruptcy and otherwise, and reasonably relied on the advice given. In short, when “estate planning” collides with creditor exposure, it is almost always the creditors who will win. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document sanderson_v._gross_family_trust.pdf (312.55 KB) Category Eastern District