Commercial Fraud Committee

The U.S. Supreme Court has, for four decades, been rocking the boat [that’s Justice Blackmun’s metaphor] on bankruptcy court authority. First, they almost killed the Code, coming within one vote of declaring the entire Bankruptcy Code unconstitutional. Then, they limit and mess with it some more.

Section 523(a)(2)(B) provides that an individual debtor’s debt is not discharged to the extent the debt was obtained by use of a statement in writing that (1) is materially false, (2) is respecting the debtor’s financial condition, (3) is one on which the creditor reasonably relied and (4) was caused by the debtor to be made or published with intent to deceive. Recently, in Privitera v.

It is well settled that state law statutes of limitations do not affect a trustee’s ability to bring fraudulent transfer actions, so long as the limitations period has not expired before the petition date.[1] Assuming that the limitations period has not expired, the limitations period essentially freezes, and the bankruptcy trustee has two years of “breathing room” to investigate and bring fraudulent transfer claims.[2]

In December 2014, attorneys and financial advisors serving both unsecured creditors’ committees and trustees watched as the Second Circuit expanded the “safe-harbor” provision available to defendants in certain clawback litigations. The safe-harbor provision was designed by Congress to protect certain securities and other transactions including “settlement payments” from avoidance actions. In 11 U.S.C. 546(e),[1] the Bankruptcy Code sets forth that a trustee may not avoid a transfer that was a settlement payment to (or for the benefit of) a broker or financial institution, or for a payment made in connection with a securities contract.

In a case of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that loan payments related to a two-tiered securitization structure are protected from avoidance by 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). Specifically, in Krol v. Key Bank National Association (In re MCK Millennium Centre Parking LLC),[1] the court held that the debtor’s payments on a nondebtor affiliate’s loan, which had been transferred into a trust as part of a commercial mortgage-backed securitization, were made “in connection with a securities contract” under § 546(e) and, therefore, were not avoidable as preferential or constructively fraudulent transfers.

Two recent cases suggest that broadcasters who advertise a debtor’s fraudulent business may be vulnerable to § 548 claims. If the broadcaster received notice of the debtor’s fraudulent business practices, it may lack good faith. Yet a recent decision from the Fifth Circuit suggests that even if good faith exists, advertising that grew the debtor’s fraud does not provide reasonably equivalent value. In this first of two articles, good faith is addressed.

In this edition of the Commercial Fraud Committee Newsletter, we introduce a new feature: an interview with a Commercial Fraud Committee member. Our inaugural interviewee is Richard Lauter, Commercial Fraud Committee Chair. Rich is a partner at Freeborn & Peters LLP in Chicago, where he leads his firm’s Bankruptcy and Restructuring Group.

Over the past several years, creditors, bankruptcy trustees and receivers have used § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) to “claw back” amounts paid to winning investors in a Ponzi scheme (i.e., payments made to investors greater than their investment).

A series of recent Tenth Circuit decisions illustrate the potential pitfalls defendants face in relying on the good faith and subsequent transferee defenses in fraudulent transfer avoidance claims.[1] In both cases, law firms were required to return fees they had undisputedly earned.

Section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a defense to a party found to have received a fraudulent transfer: If the transfer is received for value and in good faith, the transferee may retain the property to the extent value was given in exchange.[1]